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Abstract: The EC Directive on Financial Instruments Markets 2004 (MiFID) has 
introduced a number of order and trade publication obligations imposed on organized 
exchanges, Alternative Trading Systems (ATS), and the class of broker dealers that 
execute transactions in shares internally. This article investigates the impact of MiFID’s 
trade transparency rules on the trading volume of EU equity markets in a forward-looking 
mode. We use data extracted from the closest possible precedent and examine trading 
volume levels before and after trading in FTSE100 stocks on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) shifted from the quote-driven Stock Exchange Automatic Quotation System 
(SEAQ) to the order-driven Securities Electronic Trading Service (SETS). This change 
resulted in significantly increased transparency standards. Trading volume is measured 
on the basis of three criteria: volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and turnover 
ratio. No evidence is found indicating that higher transparency standards lead per se to 
higher levels of trading volume. Therefore, the impact of MiFID’s transparency rules on 
trading volume in EU equity markets should become a matter of further study following 
their implementation. 
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1 .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
The EC Directive on Financial Instruments Markets (MiFID)1 introduces a number of 
order and trade publication requirements imposed on organized exchanges, called in the 
Directive regulated markets, qualifying ATSs, called in the Directive Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTFs), and broker dealers that execute internally transactions in shares 
admitted to trading on an organized market in the EU on an organized and systematic 
basis, called in the Directive systematic internalisers. These raise significantly the levels 
of transparency of EU equity markets. This article explores the possible impact of 
MiFID’s rules on trading volume in EU equity markets as a guide for EU policy-making 
in this area taking also into account the findings of finance and regulation literature on 
market microstructure.2 The mere existence of an efficient price discovery mechanism is 
in itself insufficient if investors want to transact at efficient prices; in other words: 
‘[e]fficient prices, after all, are unimportant if one can transact only a 100-share lot at 
these prices’.3 Thus, the actual impact of MiFID’s transparency rules on trading volume 
in EU equity markets will have direct influence on the efficient operation of these 
markets. 
Keynes has suggested that the degree of liquidity of an asset can be measured on 
the basis of: (a) the riskiness of its final value (ability to realise the asset’s value) and (b) 
the availability of the market to readily absorb the sale of the asset without any serious 
downward pressure on the price of the asset. The absorptive capacity of the market has 
been used by certain authors as a measure of liquidity4 and is to a certain extent 
dependent on prevailing levels of trading volume. Another criterion for measuring 
liquidity is the depth of the bid/offer spread in quote driven markets and the difference 
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  Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments, OJ L 145/1. 
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 For an overview see Mahoney (2003), O’Hara (1999), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kini and Mian 
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 Madhavan et al. (2001).  
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between the best buy and sell limit orders in order driven markets.5 This article does not 
purport to measure the liquidity impact of MiFID on EU equity markets but rather to 
examine its possible effect on trading volume, which, in turn may have a significant 
bearing on prevailing levels of liquidity. In order to measure trading volume we use three 
criteria: volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and turnover ratio. 
Since MiFID has not yet been implemented in EU Member States, we examine 
the shift of the LSE from SEAQ to SETS on 20 October 1997 to draw tentative 
conclusions on MiFID’s predicted impact on trading volume. The examined period 
extends from 22 October 1992 to 18 October 2002. The data set comprises the price, the 
volume-based turnover and the number of ordinary shares in issue, on a daily basis, for 
seventy stocks that remained in the FTSE100 index throughout the period under 
investigation. Thirty stocks did not maintain a presence in the basket of FTSE 100 for the 
entire post-SETS period. The data was obtained from DataStream©. 
International financial markets witnessed during the examined period three very 
important developments. The first development was the radical transformation of market 
structure through the introduction of ATSs. The second development was the advent of 
Internet trading, which allowed retail investors much higher levels of access to stock 
trading. The third development was the stock market bubble of the late 1990s, which 
increased trading volume in a rather non-linear and unexpected manner. If the impact of the 
aforementioned market developments on trading volume is isolated, then there is no 
evidence that the enhanced trade transparency standards, which followed the introduction 
of SETS, increased the market’s absorptive capacity. 
This article is divided in five sections. The first section is the present introduction. 
The second section provides a brief discussion of the mechanics of market transparency and 
its perceived impact on trading volume. The third section explains the new transparency 
obligations that MiFID imposes on: (a) organized securities markets, (b) Multilateral 
Trading Facilities, and (c) ‘systematic internalisers’. The fourth section examines the 
impact on trading volume of the LSE’s shift from a dealer market to an order-driven 
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market. The fifth section brings the different strands of the present discussion to a 
comprehensive conclusion. 
2 .  M a r k e t  T r a n s p a r e n c y  a n d  M a r k e t  W e l f a r e  
2.1 Defining Market Transparency 
A transparent market is a market that combines three elements: (a) constant flow of issuer 
specific information, (b) disclosure of material interests in financial assets, and (c) pre- and 
post-trade dissemination of information about orders and trades. The first two elements are 
regulated by mandatory disclosure rules and their discussion falls outside the scope of this 
article.  
Price transparency means the public availability of information about superior 
prices for the conclusion of certain trades specified as to their quantity. Trade transparency 
means the public availability of information about current trading flows on the market in 
terms of volume. As a market must be transparent before and after the conclusion of the 
transaction, relevant rules regulate the level of both pre-trade and post-trade transparency. 
Pre-trade transparency means the availability of data about the size and price of orders 
flowing to the market, pending execution. Also information about the prices at which a 
market maker is ready to buy and sell securities of a specified size (quote). Post-trade 
transparency means the availability of information after the conclusion of a transaction, 
especially information about the specific price, quantity, and time of the transaction. 
Maximum post-trade transparency would comprise immediate publication of data about the 
price and volume of each transaction, as well as the identification of the transacting 
parties.6  
Order-driven securities markets usually maintain a high level of invisibility of pre-
execution orders and price limits imposed on them, until the time of execution. Dealer 
markets have, usually, high levels of pre-trade transparency. Market makers on the LSE, for 
instance, before the introduction of SETS, used to post their quotes on SEAQ screens, and 
this ensured a high level of pre-execution price visibility. On the other hand, post-trade 
transparency is considerably higher in order-driven markets, which, in general, publish 
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information about matched trades immediately. In dealer markets, delayed publication of 
information about completed trades is the norm.7 
2.2 The Welfare Effects of Market Transparency Rules 
Because of the complexity of the price discovery mechanism market information is of 
considerable value to those who may wish to trade in the near future. Market participants 
may employ the so-called ‘trade’ and ‘price decoding’ techniques in order to deduce new 
information from the posted quotes or incoming order flow, as well as from completed 
trades.8 Depending on the reliability of such information and investor’s technical expertise 
and skill, wide availability of information improves the allocative efficiency of investor 
trading. This is achieved because a more equitable distribution of actual and potential 
trading profit opportunities between broker-dealers and market users (outside investors) is 
ensured by restricting9 the ability of brokers and exchange members to front-run client 
trades.  
Furthermore, trade transparency rules are introduced as a means to ensure: (a) better 
execution of client orders and (b) the reduction in the frequency of market abuse in the 
form of insider dealing and market manipulation, as large trades or their source may, 
eventually, be detected.10  
Yet, the producers of trade information, namely, those who have just transacted, 
cannot be compensated. Thus, the same public-collective good argument employed to 
justify mandatory disclosure rules11 may also be used in the present context. Namely, it is 
assumed that, in the absence of strict publication requirements, trade information would 
remain under-supplied, favouring internalizing brokers and/or exchange members over 
outside traders. In the absence, for instance, of rules that oblige broker/dealers to publish 
investor limit orders on receipt, dealers can front-run client orders,12 or leave them to expire 
in order to execute them from their books at a more advantageous price. 
However, regulatory initiatives to increase market transparency standards usually 
face strong opposition that is based on the following arguments: 
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(a) If traders lose their ability to capture most of the value of information they have 
acquired through hard effort they will cease searching for new information. This 
development would harm the information efficiency of market prices;  
(b) if traders cannot conceal their positions, until they have extracted the full value of 
private information, increased transparency standards may cause an outflow of trades 
from the market concerned. Large traders, in particular, can become very vulnerable. If 
information about their trades becomes readily available, the market might turn against 
their positions. Large traders might in response abstain from active trading;  
(c) changes in a market’s transparency alter a trader’s ability to strategically reveal 
orders. This results in increased transaction costs and reduced liquidity, because trades 
are withdrawn to avoid revealing orders to ‘noise’ and other ‘parasitic’ traders;13 
(d) a requirement of immediate publication of trade information may penalize market 
makers, which are legally obliged to provide liquidity in the market for the relevant 
financial asset.14 Therefore, trading volume seems to migrate from the very transparent 
markets to those with lower pre- and post-trade transparency; 
(e) it seems that lower transparency standards reduce transaction spreads, since market 
makers tend to offer better prices on block trades, when these remain concealed for some 
time, because they can exploit the information conveyed by such trades.15   
Nonetheless, many arguments against high standards of market transparency contain 
loopholes. First, traders that acquire and read accurately new information or reinterpret 
already available information faster than the rest of the market can, for a while, make 
superior returns over that information. Secondly, arguments have been offered against the 
view that high transparency standards inhibit trading volume and liquidity.16 Increased 
market transparency standards might, for instance, result in lower instead of higher trading 
costs and thus increase liquidity. In a dealer market, the dealer is exposed to the danger of 
being taken advantage by informed traders. As a result, he widens his bid/offer spread 
raising the trading costs of uninformed traders. On the other hand, in a relatively 
transparent market where the dealer is less concerned with the possibility that he might 
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incur losses to insiders he lowers his spreads decreasing investors’ trading costs. The 
argument applies equally to order-driven markets. Investor monitoring of trading trends 
becomes easier, and their ability to respond faster to them leads, possibly, to increased 
trading volume.17 Also, as experience from the operation of London Inter Dealer Brokers 
(‘IDBs’)18 demonstrates, the withholding of trade information is not used by market dealers 
only in order to protect their trades, but also in order to provide inaccessible trade 
information to selected clients.19 In addition, it seems that the rapid publication of post-
trade information improves investor confidence that ‘they obtain fair prices’, possibly, 
attracting additional order flows.20  
Moreover, the multiplication of electronic trading channels, as, for instance, the 
ATSs,21 makes market transparency a matter of cardinal importance for reasons of 
protection of the integrity of the price formation mechanism. In this context, another issue 
that has emerged over the recent years is the transparency of executing brokers’ order 
books, especially in respect of limit orders and above all the transparency of transactions 
executed internally by highly integrated financial institutions. These have the ability to 
execute a client’s order against a proprietary position or match internally two opposite 
client orders without having to send it to an exchange or an ATS for execution. It is 
unlikely that, in the absence of very large trades, which are subject to mandatory reporting 
requirements, the marketplace will receive information about the details of such 
transactions in a timely manner. The issue of internalization was one of the most 
controversial topics that MiFID has sought to regulate. It raises concerns about the 
information efficiency of securities markets’ price formation mechanism, because of 
limited availability of price and trade information and trade fragmentation, and issues of 
best execution of investors’ orders.22  
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 e.g. the display of limit orders may encourage new limit orders to be submitted.  
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 On the LSE market makers’ trades executed through IDBs were not appearing on the main SEAQ 
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October 1997. 
19
 This custom allowed large traders with close links with securities dealers to trade at better prices than the 
average investor. Steil (1996, p. 37) and O’Hara (1995, p. 164). 
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 Gemmill, (1994, pp.26-27). 
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 See Harris (1993). 
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Notwithstanding the above, accepting that market transparency plays a very 
crucial role in ensuring the fair operation of financial markets does not mean that 
financial exchanges and their members should not ascertain property rights over market 
(trade and price) information.23 In the highly competitive environment that these operate, 
selling financial information constitutes a very legitimate source of income. Exchanges 
can negotiate with interested investors information access agreements on a purely 
commercial basis.24  
Exchanges, ATSs and internalizing brokers should, however, have no right to 
restrict access to trade information to any investor who is willing to pay the required 
price, in much the same way that lighthouses could not discriminate against passing ships 
in nineteenth century Britain, which, as Coase proved, was not a public service but was 
financed through levies raised on shippers.25 A modified version of this approach is, 
arguably, followed by MiFID, which seems to allow (through the use of the term: on 
‘reasonable commercial terms’) commercial negotiations between investors and other 
users of market data and operators of both MTFs26 and organized exchanges27 for the 
right to have direct and immediate access to pre- and post-trade information. In this 
sense, market information preserves its ‘public/collective good’ character, while 
members or owners of the facility on which such information is generated are 
compensated for their services.28 
3 .  M i F I D  R u l e s  o n  M a r k e t  T r a n s p a r e n c y  
3.1 The Transparency Obligations of Regulated Markets  
MiFID imposes on operators of both MTFs29 and regulated markets (exchanges)30 
obligations for the timely publication of pre- and post-trade information. This information 
covers bid and offer prices, the depth of trading interest and order flow, volume, price 
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 Mulherin et al. (1991) and Mahoney (1997, p. 1479). 
24
 See also Mulherin et al. (1991, pp. 633-637) and Mahoney (1997, pp. 1480-1481). 
25
 Coase (1974, p.357). 
26
 MiFID, Arts 29 and 30. 
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 Arts 44 and 45. 
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 See also Mahoney (1997, pp. 1481-1482). 
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 Arts 44 and 45. 
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and the time of completed trades, in respect of shares admitted to trading on a regulated 
market.  
The pre-trade transparency obligations of regulated markets involve the 
continuous publication of information about: 
(a) Current bid and offer prices which are advertised through their systems for shares 
admitted to trading (pre-trade transparency);31  
(b) the specific types of order, the bid/offer spread in order-driven markets. 
The types and size of quotes that designated market-makers in quote-driven markets will 
be required to publish are to be determined by subsequent legislation, the so-called Level 
2 implementing measures.32 The display of large size orders and quotes or of orders and 
quotes in illiquid securities may be exempted,33 as such display may inhibit liquidity.  
In the case of completed trades, regulated markets have the obligation to publish 
the price, volume and time for all trades in equity instruments ‘concluded under the rules 
and systems of the market on a reasonable commercial basis and as close to real time as 
possible’34 (post-trade transparency). The reporting of the details of large trades and 
trades in illiquid securities could be deferred. The range of orders/quotes to be disclosed 
will also be defined by Level 2 implementing measures.  
3.2 The Transparency Obligations of MTFs 
Among other obligations imposed by MiFID on investment firms and market operators is 
the objective, fair, timely and efficient handling of trading interests expressed through 
MTFs.35 The authors of the Directive have tried to achieve this objective through, inter 
alia, the imposition of pre- and post-trade transparency obligations in respect of equity 
transactions concluded on MTFs,36 which are largely symmetrical with the transparency 
obligations imposed by MiFID on regulated markets for similar orders or transactions 
displayed on or concluded through such markets. MTF operators have no post-trade 
transparency obligations, namely, the obligation to publish data on concluded trades, 
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 MiFID, Art. 44(1). 
32
 On the structure and workings of the so-called Lamfalussy process, the method used for the production of 
financial services legislation in the EU, see Avgouleas (2005, pp. 328-333).  
33
 MiFID, Art. 44(2). 
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 Art. 45(1). 
35
 Art. 14(1). 
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 Arts 29 and 30. 
 10 
where relevant information is made public under the system of a regulated market.37 
Possibilities for deferral of trade reporting, and the range/depth of pre-trade disclosure are 
quite similar to those applicable to regulated markets.38 Also, auction-crossing systems 
and other types of MTFs, which do not involve prior disclosure of firm indication for 
prices, may be exempted from the scope of the pre-trade transparency obligation.39 
3.3. The Transparency Obligations of ‘Systematic Internalisers’ 
Article 27 of the MiFID, which places pre-trade disclosure obligations on investment 
firms that act as ‘systematic internalisers’40 is one of the most controversial provisions of 
the Directive, and was considered by many in the industry as very intrusive to investment 
firms’ economic freedom.  
Article 27 requires investment firms, which execute client orders in shares 
internally and outside of a regulated market or an MTF on an organized and systematic 
basis to publish firm quotes, namely to disclose to the market the prices at which they 
would be willing to buy from and/or to sell to their clients shares admitted to trading in a 
regulated market.41 The publication obligation is limited to transactions up to ‘standard 
market size’, defined as the ‘average size’ for the orders executed in those shares on EU 
markets.42 This provision ensures that European wholesale markets are not be subject to 
the rule and thus wholesale broker-dealers shall not be exposed to significant risks in 
their role as market makers.  
‘Systematic internalisers’ must make public their quotes regularly and 
continuously, during normal trading hours. As firms are obliged to make public such 
quotes on a reasonable commercial basis, MiFID allows ‘systematic internalisers’ to 
decide the group of clients to whom they shall make such quotes available (retail or 
professional),43 and the number of transactions they may undertake from the same 
                                                 
37
 Art. 30(1). 
38
 Arts 29(2) and 30(2). Art. 30(2) requires MTFs to obtain the competent authority’s prior approval in 
respect of arrangements governing deferred trade publication. 
39
 Art. 29 (2) and (3)(c). 
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 Art. 4(7) of MiFID defines as ‘systematic internalisers’ investment firms, which, on an organised, 
regular, and systematic basis, deal on own account by buying and selling financial instruments against their 
proprietary capital. 
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 Art. 27(1). 
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 Ibid.  
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 MiFID Art. 27(3). 
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client.44 The same firms have post-trade transparency obligations for transactions in 
shares admitted to trading on a regulated market, which they execute internally and 
outside of a regulated market or an MTF. They must make public details of such 
transactions ‘as close to real time as possible’.45  
Given the importance of the terms ‘standard market size’ and ‘average size’, it is not 
surprising that the debate in the EU as to the content that should be given in these terms 
in the forthcoming EU Directive, which as a Level 2 implementing measure, in 
accordance with the Lamfalussy process, will give meaning to many of MiFID’s opaque 
concepts, is quite heated. Providing definitions that are not expansive enough as to cover 
the majority of medium size trades in equities may be of crucial importance for 
maintaining and increasing trading volume in EU equity markets, in view of ever 
growing global competition for the provision of trade intermediation and execution 
services. For this reason, one of the central themes of this paper is to raise awareness 
about the adverse consequences that the restrictive content of market maker’s obligation 
to timely publish their quotes in regulated markets (Article 44(3)) and the reach of 
systematic internalisers’ order and trade publication requirements may have on EU equity 
markets. 
4 .  M e a s u r i n g  t h e  I m p a c t  o f  T r a n s p a r e n c y  R u l e s  o n  T r a d i n g  
V o l u m e  
4.1 Identifying the Appropriate Benchmark to Measure Trading Volume  
There is an extensive literature dealing with measures of trading volume. Andersen 
(1996), Campbell et al. (1993), Gallant et al. (1992), Karpoff (1987), Lamoureux and 
Lastrapes (1994), and Lo and Wang (2000) are some of the studies that investigate the 
properties of various measures of volume. Karpoff (1987) and Lo and Wang (2000) have 
reviewed the most important surveys of measures of trading volume. Based mainly on the 
relevant study of Lo and Wang (2000), we use the following three measures of trading 
volume: 
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 The number of shares traded for asset i  on a particular day t , called here volume-
based turnover, ity , . 
 The number of shares that were traded at the current day’s t  closing price, called 
here value-based turnover, itit py ,, . 
 The ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value:    itititit pYpy ,,,, , where 
itit pY ,,  is the market value of asset i  on day t , and itY ,  represents the ordinary shares in 
issue of company i  at current date t . Note that the number of shares traded to the total 
number of shares outstanding, or itit Yy ,, , gives the same result. Datar et al. (1998) have 
used turnover ratio (number of shares traded as a fraction of the number of shares 
outstanding) as a proxy for liquidity, in order to provide an alternative measure of 
liquidity to Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) posted bid/offer spread. 
We use a sample that covers the period from October 22, 1992 to October 18, 
2002. The data set consists of the price, the volume-based turnover and the number of 
ordinary shares in issue, on a daily basis, for seventy stocks that belong to the FTSE100 
index during the period that is investigated. The data were obtained from DataStream. 
Both the pre-SETS and post-SETS sample periods consist of 1262 trading days.46  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 depicts the price index, volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and 
the turnover ratio for the FTSE100 index from October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
From a visual inspection, all three measures of trading volume are clearly higher in the 
post-SETS period. However, there are two main drawbacks in using the volume-based 
turnover and value-based turnover criteria. The number of shares outstanding has an 
increasing trend, which drives, by default, volume-based turnover to higher levels. 
Moreover, the price levels in the post-SETS period, due to the stock market bubble, are 
higher than in the pre-SETS period driving, by default, to higher levels the value-based 
turnover. So, it may be proper to devise a measure of trading volume that links, in a 
standard form, trading turnover with the total value of the market. Hence, the turnover 
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ratio could be identified as the measure of trading volume that remains resistant to market 
changes, namely, changes in the price of relevant stocks and changes in the number of 
outstanding shares.  
4.2. The Example of SETS 
As mentioned above, MiFID’s rules on market transparency have not yet been 
implemented. However, we can still draw assumptions as to the possible impact of their 
implementation on trading volume by examining the impact of analogous measures 
imposed in the past, which changed the way securities markets published order and trade 
information. The closest example that can be found is the introduction of increased trade 
transparency standards in the LSE as a result of its transition from a dealer (quote-driven 
market) to an order driven market on 20 October 1997, when trading of FTSE100 stocks 
moved from SEAQ to SETS. Since SETS operated as a central order book, the change 
ensured higher levels of both pre-trade and more crucially post-trade transparency. 
However, unlike most central order books, on SETS, pre-trade transparency is also high 
because the limit orders submitted to the book are visible to all market participants. Thus, 
SETS displays the full current depth of the order book. SETS has also increased the level 
of post-trade transparency FTSE100 stocks with the exception of trades exceeding eight 
times Normal Market Size (NMS), where the trade need not be published until after the 
dealer has unwound 80 per cent of the original position.47 This was a major reform, as 
such trades remained undisclosed for between thirty minutes and several hours under the 
SEAQ regime. 
We shall attempt to illustrate below, in a quantitative manner, that if market 
developments that are not related to the transition from a dealer to an order driven market 
on 20 October 1997 are properly accounted for, then there was not, in fact, a statistically 
significant increase in trading volume levels for FTSE100 stocks that is directly related to 
changes in the standards of market transparency. 
We assume that the variables observed in markets (i.e., equity prices, trading 
volume) are priced in continuous time, but the relevant data is sampled discretely in time 
with a constant sample frequency. Hence, we define itmy ,)( , for ,...2,1 mmt  , as a 
discrete time positive-valued process at day t , for asset i , with m  observations per day. 
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 Ganley et al. (1998, p. 3, Table 2). 
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Accordingly, trading volume may be expressed by measuring levels of trading activity, 
which are directly observed in discrete points in time. Moreover, we assume a sample 
frequency of a daily base, or 1m , and we rewrite itit yy ,,)1(  , for reasons of simplicity. 
Hence,  T
tit
y
1,   refers to the discretely observed series of trading volume of asset i  at 
days Tt ,...,2,1 . For the purposes of this paper, we use a sample of data such that the 
day n , at which the SEAQ was replaced by SETS, is equal to 1)2( T  and we identify 
two sub-groups: (a) 2,...,1 T  and (b) TT ,...,12 . Thus, there are 2,...,2,1 T  days prior 
to 20th of October 1997 and TTT ,...,22,12   days after the introduction of SETS48. 
4.3. Non-parametric Hypothesis Testing 
Having already defined the period that will be examined and the stocks that comprise the 
tested sample we turn now to offer a method to investigate whether the level of trading 
activity differs prior to and after the enactment of the specific rule at day n . Figure 2 
presents the frequency distribution histogram of the three measures used here to calculate 
trading volume on FTSE100 stocks during the examined period. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
In order to test the null hypothesis that the first subgroup median is greater than or equal 
to the second subgroup median against the alternative hypothesis that the first subgroup 
has a lower median than the second sub-group, we have to apply a non-parametric test, 
which does not require the assumption that the differences between the two samples are 
normally distributed and the variances are equal: 
     T
Ttit
T
tit
ymedymedHo
12/,
2/
1,
:   , 
     T
Ttit
T
tit
ymedymedH
12/,
2/
1,1
:   . 
The Mann-Whitney test49 is one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests and it is 
considerably more powerful than the usual parametric tests when applied to non-normally 
distributed data sets. A rejection of the null hypothesis leads to the conclusion that the 
                                                 
48
 Of course, samples of unequal sizes can also be used, as long as there are no major differences in the 
sample sizes. 
49
 For more details about the Mann-Whitney test see Sheskin (2003).   
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liquidity levels of SEAQ were lower than those of SETS.50 Of course, we expect a less 
frequent rejection of the null hypothesis when the turnover ratio is used as the trading 
volume measure. According to the results presented in Table 1, in the case of the 
FTSE100 index, the null hypothesis is rejected at any level of significance, indicating that 
the median of trading volume is greater in the post-SETS period, irrespectively, of which 
measure of trading activity is used. 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In the sequel, the hypothesis is tested separately for each of the seventy stocks and 
the three measures of trading volume. Tables that present the median values of trading 
volume measures in the pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney statistics 
and the relative p-values for each of the three measures are available upon request by the 
authors. In the case of the volume-based turnover, from the total of the seventy stocks, 
only in five cases the null hypothesis is not rejected. As regards the BG Group, British 
American Tobacco, Foreign and Colonial and Hanson stocks their pre-SETS medians of 
trading volume are statistically greater than their post-SETS medians, while in the case of 
the Rexam stock the median of turnover volume in the pre-SETS period is not 
statistically lower than the median in the post-SETS period. 
As regards value-based turnover, in sixty seven of the seventy cases the post-
SETS median of trading volume is greater than the pre-SETS median. For any level of 
significance, the null hypothesis is rejected for all the cases but for the Hanson, Rexam, 
and Tomkins stocks. However, that measure of trading volume suffers from subjectivity 
as it is highly related to the current conditions of the market. For example, in the case of a 
‘bull’ market, where a sudden increase of stock prices is often observed, the increase in 
value-based turnover is an immediate consequence. Note that the period of 1998 and 
1999 is a period of abrupt increase of market prices. 
When the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value is used to measure 
trading volume, the null hypothesis is not rejected at 1% level of significance, for twenty 
of the seventy stocks. However, even this measure of trading activity, which is proved 
                                                 
50
 Various rank-based nonparametric tests of the hypothesis, namely, that the subgroups have the same 
median, against the alternative that at least one subgroup has a different median, without the need to 
assume that distributions have to be normal and the variances have to be equal, may be found in Conover 
(1980). 
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robust to market changes, is statistically greater after Monday, October 20, 1997, in the 
71% of the cases, at any reasonable level of significance. 
4.4. Isolating the Effect of SETS on Trading Volume from Exogenous to Market 
Transparency Events 
Undoubtedly, overall trading volume is greater in the post-SETS sample. But, is the 
observed increase on the level of trading volume attributable to the replacement of the 
LSE’s trading system, or was it affected by exogenous to this replacement events? To 
answer this question we should take into consideration the effect of events that are 
independent to the discussed change. For example, during the surveyed period financial 
markets experienced the impact of technological revolution which radically transformed 
trading infrastructure, especially trade execution mechanisms, the speed of dissemination 
and amplification of market information, and investors’ and traders’ access, e.g., trading 
on the Internet by retail investor. The latter led to a very significant increase in the 
number of investors who actively traded on developed securities markets in the post-1997 
period. In addition, from 1997 to 1999 securities markets in most of the Western world 
experienced one of the strongest bull markets in their history, which resulted in the 
creation of multiple ‘stock market bubbles’. This bull market was followed by a bear 
market, which lasted until the end of the period covered by the sample. Thus, in order to 
take into consideration events exogenous to the introduction of SETS, we introduce two 
alternative analysis approaches. 
4.5.  A Deterministic Isolation of Long-Term Trading volume  
4.5.1  The First Approach   
In the first approach, we use alternative criteria to measure trading volume by subtracting 
the long-term trading volume that is present on both sub-samples. Using a regression 
model we remove the upward trend, which is present on the whole sample. Thereinafter, 
we test whether the remaining trading volume differs prior to and after the introduction of 
SETS. Let us consider that trading volume is expressed by a non-linear function of time, 
 tf , and the unpredictable component, it , . As the trading volume, as presented in 
Figure 1, has an upward trend of quadratic form, we assume that   2210 tataatf  . 
Note that  tf  is a common factor for both the pre-sample and post-sample periods, so it 
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does not discriminate against either the pre-SETS or the post-SETS period. Based on the 
three measures of trading activity, mentioned in the previous section, we define the de-
trended trading volume measures it ,,1 , it ,,2  and it ,,3 , in the following forms: 
De-trended volume-based turnover 
 tfy itit  ,,,1 , (1) 
De-trended value-based turnover 
 tfpy ititit  ,,,,2 , (2) 
De-trended turnover ratio  
     tfpYpy ititititit  ,,,,,,3 . (3) 
The parameters 0a , 1a  and 2a  in  tf  are estimated by the method of least squares, 
under the assumption that the component it ,  is normally distributed. Hence, for the case 
of the de-trended volume-based turnover, the estimated regression model is presented as: 
itit tataay ,,1
2
210,  , 
 2
,1,,1 ,0~ iit N  . 
(4) 
The estimated process  T
tit 1,,1ˆ   is the de-trended volume-based turnover, for 
2
210,,,1 ˆˆˆˆ tataay itit  , where 0aˆ , 1aˆ  and 2aˆ  are the estimated values of the 
parameters in regression model (4). In the sequel, we re-examine the hypothesis that the 
level of trading volume changes following the introduction of SETS on 20th October 
1997: 
     T
Ttit
T
tit
medmedHo
12/,,1
2/
1,,1
ˆˆ:    , 
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12/,,1
2/
1,,11
ˆˆ:    . 
(5) 
The regression model (4) is also applied for deriving the de-trended trading volume 
measures defined in (2) and (3) and the hypothesis test in framework (5) is used for the 
de-trended value-based turnover and the de-trended turnover ratio. 
The application of the model illustrated in framework (4) on FTSE100 daily 
returns yields the estimated parameters that are presented in Table 2. The Newey and 
West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are 
computed, as they are consistent estimators in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and 
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autocorrelation of unknown form. All the estimated parameters are statistically different 
to zero for any reasonable level of significance indicating the appropriateness of the 
quadratic form of  tf .51 Figure 3 depicts the plots of the de-trended measures of trading 
volume, and Figure 4 presents the relative frequency distribution histograms. The 
asymmetrical form of the histogram of frequency distribution and the high level of 
kurtosis show that the de-trended measures are still non-normally distributed. Thus, the 
use of a non-parametric test that is robust to the shortage of the normality assumption is 
as apposite here as in the previous section. 
INSERT TABLE2 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE3 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE4 ABOUT HERE 
We apply the hypothesis test in (5) for the  100,,1ˆ FTSEt ,  100,,2ˆ FTSEt  and 
 100,,3ˆ FTSEt  estimated processes. According to Table 3, for two of the three de-trended 
measures of trading volume the null hypothesis is strongly rejected, giving support to the 
assumption that the observed increase of trading volume is not attributable to the 
introduction of SETS. As regards the first of the de-trended measures the 12.356 value of 
the Mann-Whitney statistic leaves no room to dispute the lower level of the measure in 
the post-SETS period. In the case of the de-trended turnover ratio, the median values of 
pre-SETS and post-SETS samples are –0.00679 and –0.13079, respectively and the 
Mann-Whitney statistic is 4.756, with a zero p-value. On the other hand, the de-trended 
value-based turnover tells us that the introduction of SETS did not influence the levels of 
trading volume. Summing up the case for the FTSE100 index, the removal of the upward 
trend that is common to both sub-samples permits the use de-trended criteria in the given 
measures of trading volume, which lead us to the conclusion that trading volume has not, 
in fact, increased due to the introduction of SETS. This conclusion is, of course, subject 
to upholding as valid our assumption that the influence of exogenous events - events not 
related to the change of trading system and standards of transparency - on trading volume 
can be measured and isolated. 
                                                 
51
 However, when the assumption of uncorrelated, homoskedastic and normally distributed innovations is 
violated, the statistical inference concerning the estimated values of the parameters should be conducted 
very carefully. 
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INSERT TABLE3 ABOUT HERE 
For the seventy stocks that comprise our dataset, let us proceed in testing the difference 
of median values of the de-trended measures of trading volume before and after the 
introduction of SETS. In respect of the de-trended volume-based turnover and the de-
trended value-based turnover we reach to the same conclusion. The null hypothesis is 
rejected for sixty one and sixty seven stocks in the cases of the de-trended volume-based 
turnover and the de-trended value-based turnover, respectively, in 5% level of 
significance. However, in the case of the de-trended turnover ratio, the hypothesis tests 
do not give us a clear view. For thirty nine of the seventy cases the null hypothesis is 
rejected in 5% level of significance. 
We can also express the dynamic formulation of trading volume by adding a 
dummy variable in the model illustrated in framework (4) to express the change of the 
trading volume level after the day that SETS was introduced: 
ttt datataay  32210  
 2,0~  Nt  
.
21
,1
,0
else
Ttifd t


  
(6) 
Framework (6) captures both the long-term upward quadratic trend,   221 tatatf  , and 
the different level of trading volume due to the introduction of SETS, tdaa 30  . Model 
(6) is applied to all three measures of trading volume. The estimated values of the 
parameters, which are presented in Table 4, are in accordance with our findings. 
INSERT TABLE4 ABOUT HERE 
The estimated values of parameter 3a  are negative and statistically different to zero in 
two of the three cases, indicating that at the time of the introduction of SETS trading 
volume did not shift to a higher level. As regards the case of the measure of value-based 
turnover, the positive and statistically significant value of parameter 3a  may be 
associated with the sudden increase of stock prices rather than with an increase of trading 
volume. At this point we should be reminded of the main disadvantage of the turnover by 
value criterion: it is based on current levels of stock prices. Thus, it reflects the rapid 
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increase in prices that securities markets experienced during the first three years of the 
post-SETS period due to the ‘stock market bubble’ and the increased demand induced by 
easy retail investor access. Figure 5 plots the regression lines from the application of 
model (6) for the de-trended measures, giving a visual perspective of our arguments. So, 
we conclude that a) although trading activity exhibits an upward trend during the full data 
set that is examined, b) the introduction of SETS by itself did not increase the level of 
trading volume. 
INSERT FIGURE5 ABOUT HERE 
4.5.2  Simulated Evidence 
In order to investigate whether the assumption that a change in the level of trading 
volume could be efficiently captured by the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test, we run a 
Monte Carlo simulation. We create 10000 series (each series is consisted of 10000 data) 
from the data generating processes: 
 1,0~
2
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t
tt


 (7) 
and 
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 (8) 
The parameters are set equal to the values estimated for the FTSE100 turnover ratio, 
 210 ,, aaa  0743.7,000877.0,38.2  E  and   3210 ,,, aaaa  
 28027.0,0797.7,000745.0,308.2  E . The data generating process in (7) produces 
samples with a quadratic upward trend, while the data generating process in (8) creates 
data samples with a long-term upward trend and a downward shift in the level of ty  at 
time 2/Tt  . For each simulated series of both data generating process, the innovation 
series, tˆ , of the regression model tt tataay ˆˆˆˆ 2210  , is estimated. If the data 
generating process is (7) then the null hypothesis      T
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ˆˆ:     should not be rejected for the 
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 %1 a  of the cases at %a  level of significance. Accordingly, if the data generating 
process is (8) then the null hypothesis should be rejected for the  %1 a  of the cases at 
%a  level of significance. The Mann-Whitney statistic is used for conducting the 
hypothesis test. Figure 6 presents the results of the simulation study. If the generating 
process (7) derives the data, indeed for the  %1 a  of the cases the null hypothesis is not 
rejected at %a  level of significance. On the other hand, for the generated process (8), the 
total of the cases lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis. Hence, according to the 
simulated study, the procedure followed in the previous section in order to explore the 
relationship between higher standards of trade transparency, introduced as a result of the 
operation of SETS, with the observed increase in trading volume, leads to robust results 
for the Mann-Whitney hypothesis test. Furthermore, the simulation study was repeated 
for various sets of parameter values and we find out that the results were indifferent to the 
values of the applied parameters. 
INSERT FIGURE6 ABOUT HERE 
4.6.  A Stochastic Isolation of Long-Term Trading volume 
In the previous section, we attempted to answer the question whether the introduction of 
SETS had an impact on trading volume levels in the sampled FTSE100 stocks. We used 
de-trended measures of liquidity, fitted estimating a quadratic time trend, and concluded 
that market developments other than the introduction of SETS were the most important 
reasons underlying the observed increase in trading volume. However, the factors that are 
not related to the market transparency were considered deterministically. The estimation 
of a deterministic time trend may not be robust for the choice of time period. In this case, 
had we analyzed a dataset relating to a different time period, we would have assumed 
another trend for long-term trading volume. Namely, an extension of the examined 
dataset to a more recent time period, when trading volume did not continue to rise 
according to a quadratic time trend, would obviously change the form of the long-term 
trend.  
The method of stochastic time trends as developed by Harvey (1989) provides a 
statistical background to model the unobserved components along with the dummy 
variable expressing the change in the levels of market transparency. In this section, we 
propose a structural time series analysis that is based on the Kalman (1960, 1963) 
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filtering method in a state space form to estimate simultaneously the stochastic movement 
of the long-term trading volume and the effect of the change in transparency standards. 
Structural time series models provide a framework where the variable under 
investigation, ity , , is modeled as the sum of unobserved, but with a direct interpretation, 
components such as trend, it , , and irregulars, it , : 
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 (9) 
In order to focus on the impact of SETS on trading volume, a deterministic dummy, td , 
is introduced and we investigate if it is statistically significant. The stochastic property of 
irregulars, level of trend and slope of trend are driven by 2
,i , 2,i  and 2,i , respectively. 
If any of these variances is zero, the stochastic component reduces to a deterministic 
stationary process. 
The structural time series model in (9) is estimated for the three measures of 
trading volume. In all the cases, the estimated variance of the slope is close to zero, 
indicating that the slope of trend is deterministic. The application of the structural model 
illustrated in (9) on FTSE100 daily returns yields the estimated parameters that are 
presented in Table 5. Figure 7 depicts the trend, 100,FTSEt , and irregular, 100,FTSEt , 
components. The estimated values of parameter a  are not statistically different to zero in 
all the cases, indicating that, at the time of the introduction of SETS, trading volume did 
not shift to a higher level.  
INSERT TABLE5 ABOUT HERE 
INSERT FIGURE7 ABOUT HERE 
The model framework in (9) is applied for the three measures of trading volume in the 
seventy stocks of the sample. In the majority of the cases the null hypothesis that 0a  is 
not rejected. Specifically, for 10% level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected in 
four, seven and six cases as regards the measures of volume-based turnover, value-based 
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turnover and turnover ratio, respectively52. Therefore, in general terms the use of the 
stochastic method leads to a similar conclusion with that offered in the previous section: 
the introduction of SETS was not a significant contributing factor to the observed 
increase in trading volume for the stocks under consideration.  
5 .  C o n c l u s i o n  
On the basis of the three benchmarks used in this article to measure trading volume, we 
observe a clear increase in the level of trading activity of the sampled FTSE100 stocks in 
the post-SETS period. However, this result may be unrelated to any influence that 
increased transparency standards had on trading volume following the change of trading 
system and the introduction of a central order book for FTSE100 stocks. Thus, a 
procedure had to be devised to measure the influence of the introduction of SETS on 
trading volume during the examined period in isolation from that of other factors – 
factors that do not relate to this change. For this reason, we used two different methods 
that permitted us to isolate the trend in trading volume, which is common in both the pre-
SETS and the post-SETS periods. In using the first method, we removed the deterministic 
trading volume trend that is shared by both periods. We named the modified measures: 
de-trended measures of trading volume. The use of the de-trended measures led us to the 
conclusion that the introduction of SETS did not have an appreciable impact on trading 
volume for the sampled FTSE100 stocks. In using the second method, we utilized a 
stochastic structural time series analysis technique, which allowed us to reach a similar 
conclusion: the introduction of SETS did not lead to any appreciable increase in trading 
volume for the stocks under study. 
The above findings, based on properly adjusted data derived from the operation of 
SETS, indicate that the higher transparency standards, which MiFID imposes on equity 
securities trading in the EU, are an unlikely means of trading volume enhancement. The 
first possibility is that MiFID rules will fail to boost trading volume, an outcome that 
would be consistent with the findings of our study. Another possibility is that this will be 
followed by lower levels of liquidity in EU equity markets - a field in which further 
research is required. A combination of the aforementioned outcomes would harm the 
                                                 
52
 Analytical tables for the seventy stocks are on file with the authors and av
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depth and efficiency of EU equity markets. Therefore, EU law-makers must consider 
seriously the issues of trading volume and liquidity in drafting MiFID’s Level 2 
implementing measures, especially when it comes to the proper reach of the Directive’s 
rules on the publication of small and medium size trades.  
Since this article has only examined the impact of increased transparency rules on 
trading volume, further research is required to assess the likely and, once the Directive is 
implemented, actual impact of MiFID’s transparency rules on the liquidity of EU equity 
markets using as benchmark, inter alia, the depth of the bid-offer spread.  
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Figure 1. FTSE100 price index, volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and the ratio of the value-
based turnover to the market value for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
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The figure is expressed in thousands. 
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Figure 2. Histogram of the frequency distribution for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover, value-based 
turnover and the ratio of the value-based turnover to the market value for the period October 22, 1992 to 
October 18, 2002. 
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Figure 3. FTSE100 de-trended volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and turnover ratio for the period 
October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
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Figure 4. Histogram of the frequency distribution for the FTSE100 de-trended volume-based turnover, value-based 
turnover and the turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
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Figure 5. Regression line of model (6) for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover, value-based turnover and the turnover 
ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
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Figure 6. Frequency distribution histogram of the Mann-Whitney statistic values of the 
simulated series and the tabulation of the percentage counts and cumulative counts of the 
relative probability values. The results, that concern the data generated processes (7) and 
(8), are presented on the left and right panels, respectively. I.e., for the data generated 
process (7), at %5a  level of significance, the null hypothesis is rejected for the 5.21% 
of the cases. I.e., for the data generated process (8), at %5a , the null hypothesis is 
rejected for the 99.61% of the cases. 
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   Cumulative Cumulative 
Probability 
Value 
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[0.15, 0.2) 520 5.20 2015 20.15 
[0.2, 0.25) 507 5.07 2522 25.22 
[0.25, 0.3) 499 4.99 3021 30.21 
[0.3, 0.35) 507 5.07 3528 35.28 
[0.35, 0.4) 509 5.09 4037 40.37 
[0.4, 0.45) 513 5.13 4550 45.50 
[0.45, 0.5) 516 5.16 5066 50.66 
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[0.55, 0.6) 497 4.97 6103 61.03 
[0.6, 0.65) 475 4.75 6578 65.78 
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[0.3, 0.35) 2 0.02 9999 99.99 
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Figure 7. Trend line and Irregulars of model (9) for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover, value-
based turnover and turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
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Table 1. The median values of pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney 
statistics and the relative p-values for the case of the FTSE100 index. The null hypothesis 
that the pre-SETS median is greater than or equal to the post-SETS median against the 
alternative that the post-SETS period has a greater median. The null hypothesis is rejected 
for any level of significance. 
Measure of Trading volume Mann Whitney Statistics 
Pre-SETS period 
median value 
Post-SETS period 
median value p-value 
Volume-based turnover -38.594 291501.0 850954.5 0.00 
Value-based turnover -41.183 1233874 4358136 0.00 
Ratio of Turnover to Market Value -29.824 2.21% 3.38% 0.00 
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Table 2. Estimated parameters of model (4) for the FTSE100 daily returns. 
 
De-trended volume-based 
turnover 
De-trended value-based 
turnover 
De-trended turnover ratio 
 Coefficient t-Statistic* Coefficient t-Statistic* Coefficient t-Statistic* 
0aˆ  373052.7 27.052 758195.6 12.625 2.380 47.472 
1aˆ  -471.631 -19.299 375.3 3.525 -0.000877 -9.871 
2aˆ  0.379 41.786 0.707 17.890 7.43E-07 22.515 
* HAC standard errors are computed. 
 
 
Table 3. The median values of pre-SETS and post-SETS samples, the Mann-Whitney 
statistics and the relative p-values for the case of the FTSE100 index. The null hypothesis 
that the pre-SETS median of the de-trended measure of trading volume is lower than or 
equal to the post-SETS median value against the alternative that the pre-SETS period has a 
greater median. The null hypothesis is rejected for any level of significance greater than the 
relative p-value. 
Measure of Trading volume 
Mann 
Whitney 
Statistics 
Pre-SETS period 
median value 
Post-SETS period 
median value p-value 
De-trended Volume-based turnover 12.356 18212.5 -63884.6 0.00 
De-trended Value-based turnover -0.474 -72668.4 -80095.9 0.68 
De-trended  Ratio of Turnover to Market Value 4.756 -0.00679 -0.13079 0.00 
 
 
Table 4. Estimated parameters of model (6) for the FTSE100 volume-based 
turnover, value-based turnover and the turnover ratio for the period October 
22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
 Volume-based turnover Value-based turnover Turnover ratio 
 Coefficient t-Statistic* Coefficient t-Statistic* Coefficient t-Statistic* 
0aˆ  330940.9 25.26774 895480.9 18.98305 2.307945 40.49612 
1aˆ  -387.2006 -11.17568 59.67590 0.446110 -0.000745 -5.451773 
2aˆ  0.404818 20.74322 0.756502 9.316662 7.96E-07 11.81935 
3aˆ  -168885.1 -6.619655 543140.6 3.989645 -0.280274 -2.730011 
* HAC standard errors are computed. 
 
Table 5. Estimated values of model (9) for the FTSE100 volume-based turnover, value-
based turnover and turnover ratio for the period October 22, 1992 to October 18, 2002. 
 
2
100,FTSE  2 100,FTSE  Coefficient a  Standard Error t-Statistic p-value 
Volume-based 
turnover 167000 56120 -36048 138000 -0.26143 0.7938 
Value-based 
turnover 674000 238000 -170000 571000 -0.29777 0.7659 
Turnover ratio 0.62255 0.22039 -0.10114 0.52850 -0.19137 0.8483 
 
